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Introduction
Rappaport's shareholder value approach claims that managerial decisions are to be judged against their effect on shareholder wealth, i.e. their impact on the firm's stock market performance (e.g. Rappaport 1981 Rappaport , 1998 . Adopting that view the (only) relevant performance measure for managerial accounting purposes is total shareholder return to be earned by investments in the firm's stocks. However, from the perspective of optimal incentive design using total shareholder return (TSR) as a performance measure has a serious drawback, since it is well-known that a substantial part of the variation in TSR is due to exogenous events beyond control of the management. Thus, although Rappaports shareholder value approach seems widely accepted today, there is an ongoing debate about appropriate internal performance measures to be taken to evaluate managerial decisions and to be used in managerial accounting.
From an agency perspective, optimal incentives rely on performance metrics that use i) variables that are clearly aligned with the objectives of the firm (i.e. shareholder value) and ii)
variables that measure the outcome of managerial decisions sufficiently well (e.g. Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998) . In particular, there should be a direct link between managerial decisions and the performance variable. Now, many consulting firms have invented specific performance measures with the common goal to provide a metric that measures the outcome of management decisions, i.e. the firm's operating performance, in such a way that internal performance as measured by the metric is highly correlated with the firm's stock market performance.
While all these performance measures have a common goal, there is substantial heterogeneity with respect to their structure. CVA and EVA, rely on a common premise: They are based on some measure of operating performance which is compared to the costs of the resources required to generate the performance. From an accounting perspective, however, CVA and EVA represent two polar 1 Boston consulting Group promotes a performance measure called CVA that is basically an extension of Cash Flow Return on Investment (CFROI). Initially, Ottosson and Weissenrieder (1996) and Weissenrieder (1997) pioneered a slightly different performance measure that also relies on cash flows and is also called Cash Value Added. Young and O'Byrne (2001) discuss the performance measure EVA. McKinsey also promotes an accounting figure based performance measure called Economic Profit (EP) . See Trahan (1999, 2001) , Claes (2008) , Erasmus (2008) , or Friedl and Kettenring (2009) for a general discussion of value-based performance measures.
approaches to measure operating performance: While CVA measures operating performance in terms of (operating) cash flows, EVA measures operating performance in terms of accounting profits. Thus, while CVA relies on cash flow based figures EVA tries to take advantage of the information content of accounting figures. However, whether the additional information content in the accrual components of earnings improves the internal performance measurement is an open empirical question. 2 To shed light on this question, I examine the correlation of operating cash flows and earnings with firm's total shareholder returns. Using fixed firm effects regression methods for a large sample of German listed firms covering some 5,000 firm years, the analysis shows that generally operating cash flow and earnings are both positively correlated with total shareholder return. However, with increasing information asymmetry earnings become less correlated with the firm's stock market performance, and operating cash flow dominates earnings in explaining total shareholder return (and vice versa). These results suggest that from a managerial accounting perspective the information content of financial accounting figures is only valuable in settings characterized by low information asymmetries and, thus, there is no onesize-fits-all performance measure for managerial accounting purposes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the hypotheses and discusses the methodology used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data set and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and section 5 concludes.
Hypotheses and methodology
This section develops the hypotheses and introduces the methodology used in the empirical analysis.
Development of key hypotheses
The central problem examined in this study is the question whether the additional infor- Ball and Brown (1968) Sloan, 1996) . 6 3 There is a substantial amount of literature discussing value-based performance measures, e.g. Stewart (1994) , Stern, Stewart and Chew (1995) , Grant (1996) , O'Byrne (1996) , Dodd (1997, 2001) , Biddle et al. (1997 Biddle et al. ( , 1999 , Kleinman (1999 ), KPMG Consulting (1999 , Trahan (1999, 2007) , Worthington and West (2001) , Young and O'Byrne (2001) , Keef and Roush (2002) , Lovata and Costigan (2002) , Athanassakos (2007) . My study, however, differs in that I focus on the empirical question whether the additional information embedded in the accrual component of accounting earnings improve the alignment of accounting figures and a firm's stock market performance and derives implications for the optimal design of (value-based) performance measures. See Pfaff (2004) for a discussion of the literature discussing the problem from a theoretical perspective. 4 See Koller et al. (2005) for a discussion of the discounted cash flow method. 5 The accrual component of accounting figures is the difference between accounting earnings and operating cash flows (e.g. Dechow et al., 1995 or Sloan, 1996 . 6 See Lev (1989) , Dechow et al. (1995) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) for a general discussion of earnings management. However, as information asymmetries increase incentives for opportunistic earnings management will increase, since punishment of opportunistic behavior by outside shareholders is less likely (Günther et al., 2009 Obviously, hypotheses 2.b represents a competing hypothesis to hypothesis 2.a and it remains an open empirical question which of the two will stand the test.
Methodology
To examine the above hypotheses I conduct an empirical analysis in which I regress a firm's stock market performance on cash flow and accounting figures and various controls, i.e. I estimate a range of variants of the following empirical model:
where Rit = stock market performance of firm i in year t, EARit = (standardized) accounting earnings of firm i in year t, CFit = (standardized) cash flow of firm i in year t, and K1it, …, Knit = various firm-and time-specific controls. 7
Model (1) is a straight-forward generalization of the well-known value relevance models to study the informativeness of earnings figures (e.g. Warfiled et al., 1995; Pronobis et al., 2008 or Günther et al., 2009 , where instead of using EAR only, I use EAR and CF (simultaneously) as explanatory variables.
Value relevance studies generally are interested in the cross-sectional informativeness of earnings figures, and thus rely on (pooled) cross-sectional analyses. Instead I am interested in the firm-specific value relevance of a performance metric. Accordingly, I use panel data analyses, more specifically two-way fixed effects regression models with fixed firm-and yeareffects. 8 My firm-specific effects control for any (unobservable) firm heterogeneity either due to the management style, its business model or even its accounting behavior (see Pronobis et al. (2008) for a similar approach). My period-specific effects control for any change in the overall valuation level in the stock market.
Moreover, note that value-relevance studies rarely use any controls in their analyses (e.g. et al., or Pronobis et al., 2008 . However, there are numerous studies that show that there are various firm characteristics that might help to explain some variation in the firm's stock market performance. For instance, Fama and French (1993) show that beside the classical CAPM β-coefficient, firm-size and market-to-book ratio add explanatory power when explaining a firm's stock market performance. Thus, I estimate both a simple valuerelevance specification
Warfiled
as well as an extended value-relevance specification
where I follow Günther et al. (2009) and control for firm-risk (BETA), firm size (SIZE), valuation levels (market-to-book ratio MTB and earnings-to-price ratio ETP) and leverage (LEV).
Moreover, I also control for differences in ownership structures (DOMINATED), since ownership structures are often claimed to affect a firm's stock market performance (e.g. Holder-
ness, 2003).
To test my key hypotheses I run a range of variants of the above specifications. While hypothesis 1 is easily analyzed by estimating variants of specifications (2) and (3) on all firms, testing the two polar hypotheses 2.a. and 2.b is much more difficult. In this study I adopt a straight-forward but rather simple two-step approach. In the first step, I define various dummy variables proxying information asymmetries and use each of these variables to split my sample into two subsamples. This procedure results in various pairs of subsamples, where one subsample is characterized by low information asymmetry and the other by high information asymmetry. In the second step, I estimate the extended value-relevance specification on each of the subsamples and compare the coefficients β1 and β2 as well as their statistical significance for each pair of subsamples. 9
Data set and descriptive statistic
This section describes the data selection process, introduces the variables and provides some descriptive statistics.
Sample description and data sources
The sample is derived as follows: I start from all German firms listed in the EU-regulated The table illustrates the sample selection procedure that starts from all German firms listed in the EU-regulated General Standard of Deutsche Börse AG at least once during the sample period from 1998 to 2008. In the analysis, I adopt the standard procedure and consider only non-financial firms.
General
For these firms I collect accounting data and stock price information from Thomson Worldscope and Datastream and ownership data from Thomson ONE Banker. Finally, I remove non-regular fiscal years. Variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in the appendix. In the analysis I use several variables which are explained below. All data are collected from
Thomson databases (Worldscope, Datastream and ONE Banker).
Endogenous variables:
The key endogenous variable in my analysis is total shareholder return (TSR), which measures shareholder's return from investment in the firm's stock as the sum of capital gains plus dividends of the stock. I measure TSR over a 12 month period starting four months after the beginning of the corresponding fiscal year. Note that firms generally issue their annual report within two to four months after the end of the fiscal year. 12 Thus, the four-month-lag procedure, which is illustrated in Figure 1 , allows the stock market to internalize accounting and cash flow information from the annual report. 13 use a second total shareholder return measure, which is calculated over a 12 month period, starting 5 months after the beginning of the corresponding fiscal year. Second, I use two excess return measures calculated as total shareholder return (calculated based on the fourmonth-lag and five-month-lag procedure) minus the return of a buy-and-hold strategy investing in the CDAX.
Exogenous variables:
The central exogenous variables are cash flow and accounting performance. Cash flow performance is measured by operating cash flow. Accounting performance is measured by earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). To estimate their impact on stock market performance, both performance measures are deflated by average total assets of the 12 While German law requires firms to issue annual reports within a four months period, the German code of good governance (German Corporate Governance Code) recommends releasing the report within three months time. 13 Warfield et al. (1995) use a three-month-lag approach for US firms. However, the release time for German firms is slightly longer that for US firms. Accordingly, Günther et al. (2009) firm in the corresponding firm year. 14 The cash flow performance measure is denoted as CF, the accounting measure as EAR.
Besides that, I use several other controls. Firm size (SIZE) is measured as logarithm of 1 plus total assets. To control for the current level of firm value, I use two variables: MTB measures the market-to-book ratio of equity and ETP measures the current earnings-to-price ratio.
Since CF and EAR measure firm performance but TSR measures performance of an equity investment, I also use leverage (LEV) defined as total debt deflated by total assets as an additional control. Finally, to account for heterogeneity in ownership structures, I define a dummy variable DOMINATED, which takes the value 1 if the firm's free float is lower than 50%.
Variables splitting the sample into subsamples: To examine the hypotheses 2.a and 2.b I define four dummy variables that allow me to split the sample into subsamples. First, I define a dummy variable MCAP, which takes the value 1 if the firm has an above median market capitalization in the particular year. Second, I define dummy variable RND, which takes the value 1 if the firm has positive RnD expenditures in the particular year. Thirdly, I define a dummy variable INTANG, which takes the value 1 if the firm has an asset structure with an above median fraction of intangible assets in the particular year. Finally, I define DOMI-NATED as explained above. All four dummy variables proxy information asymmetries arising from firm size and complexity as well as from external monitoring. Specifically, while the first three dummy variables aim to proxy firm size and complexity the forth variable proxies external monitoring.
Descriptive statistics
An analysis of the correlation of operating performance and shareholder returns must cover boom and recession phases (see Pronobis et al., 2008) . As 14 As usual, average total assets are calculated as the arithmetic mean of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year and its equivalent at the end of the fiscal year (see Günther et al., 2009 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09
The figure 
EAR (median) CF (median)
The figure illustrates the development of standardized accounting earnings EAR (calculated as EBIT deflated by average total assets) and standardized operating cash flow CFO (calculated as operating cash flow deflated by average total assets) measured in term of median values over all firms. Variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in the appendix. Table 7 in the appendix. ---
Correlation with TSR
The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis. All variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in the appendix. The second and third column report mean and media values, respectively. The fourth column reports individual correlations with total shareholder return (TSR). Statistical significance at the 1%-level, 5%-level, and 10%-level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. The last column reports the individually the number of observations within the sample of relevant firms.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
While this result is a first indication in favor of hypotheses 1, the figures reported in Table 2 are obviously only univariate, pooled cross-sectional coefficients. Therefore, I conduct a more detailed econometric analysis in the following section.
Empirical results
This section presents results of the empirical analysis. I use two-way fixed effects regression methods, i.e. regression models with fixed firm and fixed period effects to account for unobservable firm-specific and period-specific heterogeneity. To circumvent endogeneity concerns I lag most of my controls in my regression specifications. 
Base-case regression
To examine hypothesis 1, I estimate variants of my value-relevance specifications (2) and (3) on the set of all firms in my sample. The results are reported in Table 3 Table 6 in the appendix. All specifications include period-and firm-fixed effects. t-values (reported in parentheses) are White-robust.
Statistical significance at the 1%-level, 5%-level, and 10%-level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Regression on subsamples proxying firm complexity
To examine hypotheses 2a and b I define various dummy variables, split my sample along each of the dummy variables and estimate the extended value-relevance specification (3) using two-way fixed effects models on each pair of subsamples.
In this section I use three dummy variables which proxy firm size and complexity. The first variable, MCAP, measures whether a firm's market capitalization is below or above median in a particular year. The second variable, RND, measures whether a firm has positive RnD expenditures in a particular year. Finally, the third variable, INTANG, measures whether a firm has an asset structure with below or above median fraction of intangible assets. The results of these six regressions analyses are reported in Table 4 The table reports coefficients and t-values of regressions explaining firms' total shareholder return on various complexity subsamples. Panel A splits the sample along firm size (measured in terms of market cap). Panel B distinguishes between firms with positive and zero research and development expenses. Panel C splits the sample in firms with below and above median intangible assets (deflated by average total assets). Variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in the appendix. All specifications include controls used in the extended base-case regressions, period-and firm-fixed effects.
t-values (reported in parentheses) are White-robust. Statistical significance at the 1%-level, 5%-level, and 10%-level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Grossmann and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishney, 1986 and Holderness, 2003 for a survey). The results of the regressions analyses are reported in The table reports coefficients and t-values of regressions explaining firms' total shareholder return on two subsamples, distinguishing between widely held and dominated firms. Firms are defined to be dominated when free float is smaller than 50%. Otherwise, firms are defined to be widely held.
Other variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in the appendix. All specifications include controls used in the extended base-case regressions, period-and firm-fixed effects. t-values (reported in parentheses) are White-robust. Statistical significance at the 1%-level, 5%-level, and 10%-level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Robustness of results
I challenge the above results in several ways. First, to deal with the problem of heteroskedasticity I use White-robust t-values. Second, I check variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all my specifications in order to check for multicolinearity (all VIFs are below 3.5). Third, while I only report results for the extended value-relevance specification in Table 4 and 
Summary and Conclusion
Rappaport's shareholder value approach claims that managerial decisions are to be judged against their effect on shareholder wealth, i.e. their impact on the firm's stock market performance. Adopting this view the relevant performance measure for managerial accounting purposes is total shareholder return to be earned by investments in the firm's stocks. However, from the perspective of optimal incentive design using total shareholder return (TSR) as a performance measure has a serious drawback, since it is well-known that a substantial part of the variation in TSR is due to exogenous events beyond control of the management.
Thus, although Rappaports shareholder value approach seems widely accepted today, there is an ongoing debate about appropriate internal performance measures to evaluate managerial decisions and to be used in managerial accounting. The table reports descriptive statistics of the main variables EAR, CFO, ACC and TSR. Accruals are calculated as the difference between operating cash flows (CFO) and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). ACC represent standardized accruals, i.e. accruals deflated by average total assets of the firm in the corresponding firm year. All other variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in this appendix. shareholder return measures and two excess return measures. Excess return is calculated as total shareholder return minus return of a buy-and-hold strategy investing in the CDAX. TSR_44 and TSR_55 are standard total shareholder return measures over a 12 month period starting 4 months (5 months) after the beginning of the corresponding fiscal year. TSR_44_EX and TSR_55_EX are the corresponding excess return measures. All other variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in the appendix. All specifications include period-and firm-fixed effects. t-values (reported in parentheses) are White-robust. Statistical significance at the 1%-level, 5%-level, and 10%-level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
